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3 CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT
The current account balance of the Spanish economy has improved by 11.6 pp since the 
onset of the crisis, from a deficit of 9.6% of GDP at the end of 2007 to a surplus of 2% in 
2016. While all the headings have contributed positively to this adjustment, the correction 
of the net non-energy goods balance (5.7 pp) and of the investment income balance (2.5 
pp) is most notable. The energy balance and the other services balance each contributed 
an adjustment of 1.3 pp of GDP. Finally, the tourism services surplus rose by 0.6 pp.
The analysis in this chapter shows that approximately half of the current account 
adjustment can be explained by cyclical economic developments and the fall in oil prices. 
Other factors contributing to the correction of the external balance include most notably 
the adjustment in public finances, population ageing, lower growth expectations and the 
gains in competitiveness of recent years.
The fiscal consolidation, population ageing and lower growth expectations make for a persistent 
weakness in domestic demand, which, in conjunction with the improvement in competitiveness, 
has contributed to raising the structural growth rate of exports, against a background in which 
Spanish firms are seeking new markets outside Spain. These same factors (especially the gains 
in competitiveness) have also contributed to the lower dynamism of imports in structural terms, 
partly offset by the vigour of exports in firms and sectors with a high import content.
The external vulnerability of the Spanish economy can be expected to decrease gradually 
over the coming years. Nevertheless, the risks associated with the high external indebtedness, 
which manifest themselves as a negative net IIP of 85.7% of GDP, highlight the need to run 
current account surpluses on a sustained basis in the future. Achieving this will require 
contributions from the structural consolidation of public finances and from the reform of 
factor and product markets to encourage productivity growth and to put the gains in 
external competitiveness on a firmer footing.
Since the onset of the crisis, the Spanish current account balance has undergone a 
sharp adjustment. In the years preceding the global financial crisis, the Spanish economy 
recorded current-account deficits of a size unprecedented in the historical time series (see 
Chart 3.1). The financing of these deficits raised Spain’s external debt to a very high level. 
Thus the negative net international investment position (IIP) increased by 45 pp of GDP 
between 2000 and 2007. Subsequently, the current account balance improved notably. 
Specifically, after worsening by 6 pp between 2000 and 2007, there was a correction of 
some 12 pp of GDP between 2008 and 2016.
Sluggish domestic demand, improved competitiveness, the ongoing lax financial 
conditions, cheaper oil and fiscal consolidation are some of the factors explaining 
the improvement in the external balance. During the upturn before the crisis broke, the 
overly optimistic growth outlook, the build-up of losses in competitiveness and the 
availability of abundant financing under accommodative conditions were instrumental, 
among other things, in the deterioration of the current account balance of the Spanish 
economy.1 The abrupt correction of the growth outlook and unit labour costs from 2009 
Summary
1  Introduction
1  See J. M. Campa and Á. Gavilán (2011), «Current accounts in the euro area: An intertemporal approach», Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 30, pp. 205-228, and K. Adam, P. Kuang and A. Marcet, (2012), «House Price Booms 
and the Current Account», in NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26, pp. 77-122.
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was conducive to the improvement of the external balance. Subsequently, from 2013, the 
narrowing of the spread on interest rates applied to resident agents relative to with those 
of the euro area core countries allowed the Spanish economy to gain competitiveness (see 
Chapter 2 of the 2015 Annual Report of the Banco de España) and reduce net payments 
of interest to the rest of the world, since Spain is a net debtor economy. Also, following the 
sharp deterioration of the public deficit between 2007 and 2009, the process of fiscal 
consolidation under way made for a more positive trend in national saving. Finally, the 
process of adjustment of the external deficit was driven by factors of a more temporary 
nature, such as the collapse of economic activity in the more deeply recessionary phases 
of the crisis and the fall in oil prices, which dropped from €86 to €24 per barrel between 
January 2012 and January 2016, notably reducing the energy bill.
Despite the recent improvements in the external balance, the still-high external debt 
represents one of the main vulnerabilities of the Spanish economy. At the end of 
2016, the negative net IIP stood at 85.7% of GDP, among the highest of the advanced 
economies (see Chart 3.1). Meanwhile, the gross external debt, which encompasses 
callable liabilities, amounted to 167.5% of GDP. Against this background, a worsening in 
the conditions of access to financing from the rest of the world may affect macrofinancial 
stability despite the recent shift in the composition of callable liabilities towards longer 
maturities. Mitigating this element of risk will require current-account surpluses to be run 
for a long period of time.
This chapter analyses the recent correction of the external deficit and its determining 
factors, with the aim of gauging how persistent it will be. The ability to quantify the 
various factors behind the current account adjustment allows us to determine to what 
extent we can expect the recent correction of the external balance to be lasting, and to 
thus roughly estimate the future vulnerability of the Spanish economy under alternative 
scenarios for the behaviour of its external net borrowing.
The net borrowing or lending of a nation is determined as the sum of the current account 
balance and the capital account balance. The current account is divided into four basic 
sub-balances:2 goods (exports and imports), services (including payments and receipts 
derived from tourism and non-tourism services), primary income (including, inter alia, interest 
payments and receipts on liabilities and assets, respectively, vis-à-vis the rest of the world) 
and secondary income (including, among other items, payments and receipts of migrants’ 
remittances). The capital balance, which in relative terms is smaller, is basically determined 
by capital transfers to and from the EU. Described below are the changes in the 
aforementioned headings from 2000, paying special attention to the period after 2008. 
Since all transactions recorded in the balance of payments have a financial counterpart, 
Sub-section 2.2 analyses the financial account.
The current account balance of the Spanish economy deteriorated by 6 pp of GDP between 
2000 and 2008 due to the worsening of all its headings, particularly net purchases of non-
energy goods. During the upturn before the crisis, the Spanish economy built up an 
external imbalance which reached nearly 10% of GDP in 2007 (see panel 1 of Chart 3.2). 
Except for a surplus on services (2.7% of GDP in 2007), all headings had negative net 
balances throughout the period 2000-2007, the most notable being the deficit on non-
energy goods at 5.5% of GDP in 2007. The negative contribution to the current account by 
2  Characterisation of the 
correction of the 
external balance
2.1  CURRENT ACCOUNT AND 
CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
BALANCES
2  See the “Balanza de Pagos y Posición de Inversión Internacional de España, 2014”, published by the Banco de 
España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 83 ANNUAL REPORT, 2016 3. CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT
CURRENT AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT BALANCES CHART 3.2
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1  CURRENT ACCOUNT. BALANCES
% of GDP
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
 CURRENT ACCOUNT
 CAPITAL ACCOUNT
 NET LENDING (+) / NET BORROWING (-)
6  NET LENDING / NET BORROWING
% of GDP
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
8002-61020002-7002
2  CHANGE IN CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
Change as % of GDP
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
3  GOODS AND SERVICES. BALANCES
% of GDP
-4.0
-3.5
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
 OTHER RESIDENT SECTORS
 GENERAL GOVERNMENT
 OTHER MONETARY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
 BANCO DE ESPAÑA
 TOTAL
5  INVESTMENT INCOME. BALANCES
% of GDP
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
8002-61020002-7002
4  CHANGE IN GOODS AND SERVICES BALANCE
Change as % of GDP
 ENERGY BALANCE (a)  NON-ENERGY BALANCE (a)  TRAVEL  OTHER SERVICES  PRIMARY INCOME  SECONDARY INCOME  TOTAL
 GOODS AND SERVICES EXPORTS  ENERGY GOODS IMPORTS (a)  NON-ENERGY GOODS AND SERVICES IMPORTS (a) GOODS AND SERVICES BALANCE
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
a Energy and non-energy balances are estimates by the Banco de España using Customs data.
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 84 ANNUAL REPORT, 2016 3. CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT
deficit items increased in this period, particularly that by net imports of both energy and 
non-energy goods, which rose by 0.7 pp of GDP and 1.6 pp of GDP, respectively.
Since 2008 the current account balance has improved by around 12 pp of GDP, again due 
to the behaviour of all its headings, particularly purchases of non-energy goods and the 
income balance. In this period, the Spanish economy abruptly corrected its external 
imbalance and reached a current account surplus of 2% in 2016. This is particularly 
notable because since 2014 external surpluses have coexisted with significant positive 
GDP growth, although traditionally recoveries of the Spanish economy have been 
associated with a worsening of the external balance. Since 2008 all headings have 
contributed to the correction of the current account deficit, although they have done so 
unevenly, with the non-energy goods and primary income balances being the main 
contributors (see panel 2 of Chart 3.2).
At first the adjustment was mainly through the reduction of non-energy goods imports, 
which was subsequently reinforced by an improvement in exports as a whole. The 
improvement in the trade balance reflected the adjustment of the net balance of non-energy 
goods, which went from a deficit of 5.5% of GDP in 2007 to a surplus of 0.2% in 2016 (see 
panels 3 and 4 of Chart 3.2). Initially, between 2008 and 2010 the correction was due to a 
sharp contraction of imports, to which was subsequently added a recovery of exports, 
whose weight relative to GDP reached percentages exceeding those before the crisis. 
Despite the substantial oil price rises from $30 per barrel in 2000 to $146 in 2008, the 
energy goods balance showed very limited changes in the pre-crisis period, as a result of 
the Spanish economy’s notably lower dependence on oil in this period (see Box 3.1). The 
continued improvement in energy efficiency and the recent fall in oil prices meant that in the 
last two years this component has contributed significantly to improving the current account 
balance, as the energy bill fell by 2 pp of GDP, to a deficit of 1.8% in 2016. Meanwhile, the 
improvement in the services balance was due to the buoyancy of tourism exports, partly as 
a result of geopolitical tensions in various competitor destinations,3 and to the growth of 
exports of other services. However, as a whole, the widening of the services balance surplus 
(1.9 pp of GDP between 2008 and 2016) contributed less than the correction of the goods 
balance (5.7 pp of GDP between 2008 and 2016) to the adjustment of the current account.
The investment income balance also improved significantly in the period 2008-2016. 
Specifically, the investment income deficit decreased in this period by 2.7 pp of GDP to 
0.4% in 2016 (see panel 5 of Chart 3.2). This improvement reflected the decrease in interest 
rates in the period considered and the changes in composition of external liabilities by 
institutional sector. Specifically, the relative weight of government debt held by non-
residents, the financing cost of which is generally lower than that of private-sector debt 
securities, increased. Also, the process of deleveraging undertaken by the private sector 
gave rise to an appreciable decrease in the associated net interest payments, to the point 
that surpluses of around 0.6% of GDP were recorded in 2016, contrasting with the deficit 
of 2.5% of GDP in 2008.
The role of the capital account in the adjustments seen in recent years has been 
secondary. The surplus on the capital account, which is basically determined by capital 
transfers to and from the EU, was relatively steady from 2000, so its contribution to the 
correction of the external balance was marginal (see panel 6 of Chart 3.2).
3  See Box 7 ‘‘Dynamism of non-resident tourism in 2016 and its determinants”, in “Quarterly report on the Spanish 
economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2017, Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 85 ANNUAL REPORT, 2016 3. CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT
In the years preceding the crisis, the balances of financial transactions with the rest of the 
world became progressively more negative. This was the result of net investment in Spain 
by non-resident agents (net change in liabilities or NCL) which increasingly outstripped 
residents’ investment in the rest of the world (net change in assets or NCA) (see panels 1 
and 2 of Chart 3.3). In the expansionary period prior to the crisis, the NCL was due mainly 
to the receipt of funds by monetary financial institutions (MFIs) and by securitisation 
special purpose vehicles to meet the financing needs of the private sector4 (see panels 3 
and 4 of Chart 3.3). Moreover, direct outward investment by Spanish firms exceeded the 
inward investment by foreign firms in Spain, this being a key component of the NCA during 
those years (see panels 5 and 6 of Chart 3.3).
From the onset of the crisis, the flows of investment and borrowings abroad 
decreased considerably. Both the flows of borrowings and the flows of investment 
decreased from the onset of the crisis. However, the NCL decreased more sharply than the 
NCA. This resulted in the NCA being larger than the NCL from 2012 (see panel 2 of 
Chart 3.3), giving rise to a positive balance in the financial account which has persisted in 
the last four years. Although the inflows and outflows recovered in 2014 and subsequent 
years, their composition differs from that before the crisis. Thus, regarding institutional 
sectors, other resident sectors (ORSs), which were net recipients of funds in the pre-crisis 
years, became net investors abroad after the crisis. For its part, general government, as a 
result of the ongoing high government deficits, had to raise funds which were partly 
financed by international investors through portfolio investments. 
From 2010, financial flows to and from the rest of the world were strongly influenced 
initially by the financial tensions in the euro area and subsequently by the extraordinary 
measures of the ECB. The financial tensions in the euro area between 2010 and 2012 
generated net outflows of funds abroad in the sectors other than the Banco de España, 
amounting to 15% of GDP in 2012, and a considerable increase in the central bank’s net 
liabilities as a result of the growing need of Spanish financial institutions to supplement the 
funding from the financial markets with funds from the Eurosystem.
From 2013, the resident sectors’ improved conditions of access to external financing 
allowed the outflow of foreign funds to be reversed. The progressive normalisation of the 
euro area capital markets from late 2012 significantly mitigated the need for Spanish banks 
to resort to central bank funding. Subsequently, the abundant liquidity resulting from the 
unconventional quantitative easing measures by the ECB in recent years has again 
prompted net outflows of funds in the Spanish economy, albeit of a very different nature 
from those produced by the 2012 balance of payments crisis. In fact, the recent outflows 
of funds do not reflect a worsening of economic sentiment towards the Spanish economy, 
as in 2011-2012, but rather result from a redistribution among institutions and countries of 
the abundant liquidity injected by the Eurosystem.5
In analysing the determinants of the external imbalance, it is useful to distinguish 
the contribution of temporary factors from that of longer-term factors. Various 
international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the European 
Union, have adopted a methodology which enables them to decompose the adjustment of 
the external sector according to the effect of various explanatory factors on agents’ 
2.2  FINANCIAL ACCOUNT
3  Analysis of the 
persistence of the 
recent current account 
adjustment
4  Classified in other resident sectors (ORSs).
5  For more details, see J. Martínez Pagés (2016), «The Eurosystem quantitative easing measures and the financial 
account», Economic Bulletin, April, Banco de España.
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savings and investment decisions and on the behaviour of net exports.6 This focus enables 
the determinants of a cyclical, and therefore temporary, nature to be distinguished from 
other factors. This section considers a variant of this methodology which includes a 
broader set of determinants of the external balance in order to approximate the specific 
features of the euro area and particularly of the Spanish economy.7
Notable among the temporary factors is the role of the business cycle. The sluggish 
domestic demand during a recession means that imports fall and exports rise, which helps 
to improve the trade balance and, therefore the current account balance. However, this 
effect can be expected to reverse as the cyclical upturn gets underway and the output gap 
becomes positive.
Oil prices may play a significant role in the behaviour of the external balance. Cheaper oil 
prices helped to reduce the energy balance in countries which are net importers, such as 
Spain, where the energy component represents a significant part of the current account 
balance. The degree of temporariness of oil price changes is difficult to identify a priori, 
although the high volatility of this variable in certain periods would advise against 
considering it to be an explanatory factor of the current account balance of a structural 
nature.
Other longer-term factors, such as fiscal consolidation, gains in competitiveness, 
population ageing and lower growth expectations, may also help to correct the 
external balance. Lower borrowing by general government contributes to correcting the 
external deficit through its negative effect on domestic demand. Population ageing may 
foster agents’ saving insofar as people perceive, for example, the need to top up their 
pensions under the government system. Also, weak potential growth expectations may 
entail low investment rates and, therefore, less borrowing. Finally, gains in competitiveness 
from, for example, the adjustment of labour and financial costs allow firms to compete 
internationally on better terms and increase their exports.
It is estimated that around one-third of the adjustment in the external balance 
between 2008 and 2015 was due to cyclical economic developments (see panels 1 
and 2 of Chart  3.4). Thus the cyclically adjusted current account balance, i.e. after 
stripping out the effect of the contraction in activity, amounted to a deficit of 0.2% of GDP 
in 2015, compared with the deficit of 6.9% in 2008 (see panel 2 of Chart 3.4).
The fall in oil prices in recent years also contributed significantly to the correction of 
the external balance. Euro-denominated oil prices decreased by 73% between 2012 and 
2015, which explains around one-fifth of the correction in the current account balance in 
that period (see panel 4 of Chart 3.4). In this case, although the oil price recovery is 
uncertain, it does not seem likely that there will be additional falls contributing to further 
decreases in the energy bill of the size of those seen in the period 2014-2015.
Fiscal consolidation stands out among the other factors which have contributed to 
the external balance adjustment. The structural component of the budget deficit 
decreased by 5.3 pp from 2010 to 2015. The contribution of this improvement in the public 
6  See IMF (2013), “The External Balance Assessment (EBA) Methodology”, Working Paper 13/272.
7  E. Moral-Benito and F. Viani (2017), “An anatomy of the Spanish current account adjustment: the role of 
permanent and transitory factors”, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming.
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finances to the external balance adjustment would, according to these estimates, be 
around 20% (see panel 4 of Chart 3.4).8 The budget deficit in structural terms is still far 
from the targets set by the European Commission within the framework of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, which indicates that there is leeway for the positive contribution of this factor 
to continue to improve the current account balance.9
The gains in competitiveness posted by the Spanish economy also played a significant 
role. Spain’s unit labour costs relative to the rest of the euro area decreased by 11% 
between 2008 and 2015. This improvement, together with that in financial conditions, 
proxied by the behaviour of long-term interest rates, would, in accordance with these 
estimates, explain around 9% of the cumulative adjustment in the current account between 
2008 and 2015. Admittedly, the effect on the current account of lower financing costs may 
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8  The cyclical effect of changes in the structural component of the budget deficit upon inclusion of the output gap 
have been stripped out of this estimated contribution.
9  Note that the important factor for the current account is the structural fiscal balance relative to the other 
countries. Thus, on IMF data, in 2015 Spain’s structural balance relative to the other countries improved despite 
worsening in absolute terms.
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be ambiguous a priori due to its expansionary effect on final demand; yet according to the 
results obtained, this decrease contributed to the current account adjustment insofar as the 
effect of the improvements in the competitiveness of Spanish firms in the international 
markets has prevailed over its expansionary effect on the economy.
Population ageing and lower future growth expectations also played a part in the 
correction of the external deficit. Economic theory predicts that both population ageing 
and lower future growth expectations give rise to lower levels of investment and consumption 
which, in turn, would be reflected in less dynamic domestic demand. The dependency ratio, 
measured as the ratio of the population aged over 65 to the population aged between 16 
and 65, has increased in Spain by 4.2 pp from 2008, and is expected to increase by 19.6 
pp in the next 20 years, according to INE projections. Also, as described in Chapter 1 of this 
report, the potential growth of the Spanish economy has been revised downward to around 
1.5%, from rates exceeding 3% before the crisis. These two factors explain a non-negligible 
percentage of the correction of the current account balance. Specifically, according to the 
results of the analysis (see panel 4 of Chart 3.4), the behaviour of these two factors would 
explain around 7% and 5% of the adjustment between 2008 and 2015, respectively.
The aggregate evidence points to a better performance of exports than in the pre-
crisis period which has not so far been accompanied by a change of similar 
proportions in the dynamism of imports. The behaviour of goods and services exports 
and imports as a percentage of GDP has differed in the last few years from that in the pre-
crisis period. While exports have stood clearly above their pre-crisis levels, imports have 
been slightly below (see panel 1 of Chart 3.5). Once the cyclical component of trade 
transactions with the rest of the world has been stripped out, the results suggest the 
presence of an increase in the structural growth rate of exports since the sharp contraction 
of world trade in 2009.10 Meanwhile, although the change in the structural component of 
imports is of a smaller size, its growth rates are slightly below the pre-2009 levels, once the 
effect of domestic demand and import prices is removed (see panel 2 of Chart 3.5). The 
following sub-sections explore in more detail these two components of aggregate demand 
to identify the factors determining their behaviour.
Demand from external markets is the main determinant of Spanish exports, against 
a background in which their geographical diversification has increased considerably. 
Following the sharp contraction of world trade in 2009, the recovery of external demand 
has brought positive contributions to the growth of Spanish exports, which are, however, 
lower than in the pre-crisis period given the weakness of world trade (see panel 3 of 
Chart 3.5).11 The positive performance of exports is due to a refocusing towards non-EU 
markets, and, in particular, towards the emerging economies, where demand was generally 
more buoyant during the past recession (see panel 1 of Chart 3.6).
The improved competitiveness of the Spanish economy also favoured the strong 
performance of exports, thus contributing to the gains in market share seen in 
recent years. Compared with the negative contributions of export prices in the pre-crisis 
years, the Spanish economy’s recent gains in competitiveness have helped Spanish export 
4  Goods and services 
exports and imports
4.1  GOODS AND SERVICES 
EXPORTS
10  This structural growth is based on the estimation of an unobserved components model in which the cyclical 
component of exports depends on export prices and world demand, while that of imports depends on import 
prices and domestic demand. See, for example, R. Gordon (1997), «The Time-Varying NAIRU and its Implications 
for Economic Policy», Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, pp. 11-32.
11  For more details on the estimation of these contributions, see E. Prades and C. García (2015), “Actualización de 
la función de las exportaciones de bienes”, Boletín Económico, April, Banco de España.
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growth to outstrip world import growth, enabling widespread gains in international market 
share and greater geographical diversification towards markets with higher growth 
potential (see panel 2 of Chart 3.6).
The weak domestic demand seems to have prompted Spanish firms to focus more 
on exports. Domestic demand went from representing 76% of GDP in 2009 to 67% in 
2015 (see panel 3 of Chart 3.6). This decrease coincides with a phase of strong growth of 
goods exports, up from 15% of GDP in real terms in 2009 to approximately 22% in 2015. 
Against a background of persistently weak domestic demand, the empirical evidence 
suggests that Spanish firms have been seeking new markets outside Spain.12 Indeed, 
firm-level information from the International Transaction Reporting System in force until 
end-201313 and from the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office showed 
that the firms whose domestic sales fell most sharply were the ones whose goods and 
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a Structural growth rates are obtained from the estimation of an unobservable components model in which a cyclical component is subtracted from observed growth. 
The cyclical component depends on export prices and world demand in the case of exports and on import prices and domestic demand in the case of imports.
b For more details on the estimation of these contributions, see E. Prades and C. García (2015), "Actualización de la función de las exportaciones españolas de 
bienes", Boletín Económico, April, Banco de España.
12  See, for example, P. Soares and E. Prades (2016), On domestic demand and export performance in the euro 
area countries: does export concentration matter? ECB Working Paper 1909.
13  For a description of this source, see Section 2.4.1 of the Banco de España publication “Balance of Payments 
and International Investment Position of Spain, 2013”.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 91 ANNUAL REPORT, 2016 3. CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT
DETERMINANTS OF EXPORTS CHART 3.6
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services exports underwent the strongest relative growth. This association is apparent 
even in comparison of firms belonging to the same sector (and thus exposed to the same 
sectoral shocks) and having the same size, productivity, indebtedness and import 
dependency (see Table 3.1).
As a result of the aforementioned factors, there were significant long-term increases 
in the export base of the Spanish economy. The total percentage of exporting firms 
grew sharply from 2009 (see panel 4 of Chart 3.6), with small firms (fewer than 50 
employees) being those which most stepped up their entry into foreign markets,14 although 
their contribution to total exports continues to be low.15 At the same time, the number of 
regular exporting firms has increased in the last four years by 31%, most notably in 
destinations with high potential growth such as Asia and the United States (see panel 5 of 
Chart 3.6). The fixed costs associated with the decision to export indicate that some of the 
broader exporting firm base is of a structural nature and, therefore, this development 
should prevail even in a scenario of persistent recovery in domestic demand.16
Domestic demand has been the main factor shaping imports in Spain, while the 
contribution of import prices has been limited. The fall in domestic demand triggered a 
sharp contraction of imports in the first stage of the crisis, while, in the recent recovery, its 
resurgence has not yet been sufficient to recoup the pre-2007 growth rates (see panel 4 of 
Chart 3.5). This lower contribution from domestic demand to import growth may reflect, at 
least partly, the behaviour of certain factors which, although weakening the dynamism of 
domestic demand, contribute to the correction of the external balance (fiscal adjustment, 
population ageing, lower growth expectations and others). Given the traditionally low price 
elasticity of imports, the process of internal devaluation played a more limited role in the 
aggregate behaviour of goods and services imports over the last few years.
The strong performance of exports has also caused imports to increase to the extent 
that the former generally require the use of imported products. This is particularly 
clear in a setting of geographical fragmentation of production through the global value chains, 
which increase the international trade transactions per unit of product. The information 
4.2  GOODS AND SERVICES 
IMPORTS 
14  On balance of payments information, the percentage of exporting firms with fewer than 50 employees rose from 
2.4% in 2009 to 3.4% in 2013.
15  See M. J. González and C. Martín (2015), “The internationalisation of Spanish SMEs: main developments and 
their determinants”, Economic Bulletin, December, Banco de España.
16  See, for example, R. Baldwin and P. Krugman (1989), “Persistent Trade Effects of Large Exchange Rate Shocks”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, pp. 635-654.
  -0.025***
(0.001)
  -0.028***
(0.001)
  -0.037***
(0.002)
Period 2004-2013
Period 2004-2007
Period 2009-2013
EFFECT OF GROWTH IN DOMESTIC DEMAND ON EXPORTS. MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE (a) TABLE 3.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The table sets out the coefficients of ordinary least squares estimates of a regression of the annual growth rate of firm-level exports on the growth of  firms' domestic 
sales. Also included in the regression are fixed firm effects and fixed sector-year effects, along with the following control variables: firm size, import growth, inputs, 
productivity and debt ratio.
The number of firms analysed is 1,077,862. Standard error in brackets with firm-level cluster. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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provided by the world input-output database (WIOD) allows us to quantify the high and 
growing import content of Spanish exports, which rose from 25% in 2008 to 31% in 2014 
(see panel 1 of Chart 3.7).17
The higher export growth in the sectors with greater import dependency may be 
behind the widespread increase in the import content of exports in recent years. 
According to the information in the world input-output tables, the recent gain in weight 
of the import content of exports is due more to increased exports in the sectors 
characterised by a higher import content than to an increase in imported products in 
each sector (see panel 4 of Chart 3.7). For example, sectors such as automobiles or 
chemicals have a high import dependency and, in turn, their exports have increased 
more.
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17  For a description of how to calculate the import content of the GDP components using the input-output tables, 
see M. Bussière, G. Callegari, F. Ghironi, G. Sestieri and N. Yamano (2013), “Estimating trade elasticities: 
Demand composition and the trade collapse of 2008-2009”, 5, pp. 118-151.
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The import content of other GDP components which lost weight during the crisis has 
decreased. The import intensity of private and public consumption has fallen since 2009, 
perhaps due to the decrease in household income and to the fiscal consolidation of public 
finances (see panel 1 of Chart 3.7). Specifically, the decrease in disposable income may 
have induced some households to replace the consumption of imported products and 
services, generally more expensive, with increased consumption of national goods and 
services.18 This phenomenon of substitution may have also contributed to reducing the 
import intensity of government consumption. Meanwhile, the weight of imports in 
investment recovered to pre-crisis levels following the fall in the period 2008-2010. All 
things considered, the information drawn from WIODs up to 2014 shows that the recovery 
of the pre-crisis levels of Spanish imports at the aggregate level conceals highly uneven 
behaviour by the various components of GDP.
The purchases abroad of Spanish firms suggest a certain replacement of imports by 
domestic production in the recent period. The firm-level information from the Banco de 
España’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office allows the substitution of national goods 
made by Spanish firms for imports to be analysed. Specifically, following an ongoing 
decrease in the weight of national inputs, a change of trend is apparent from 2012 (see 
panel 3 of Chart 3.7). Once the effect of relative prices is stripped out, a fall in imports 
from the EU can be appreciated.19 Also, it is found that, upon an unexpected injection of 
liquidity into the firm, the increase in imported inputs exceeded that of national firms in 
the years prior to the crisis, while this response changed sign in the years following the 
crisis, when the increase in imported factors was smaller than that in national factors20 
(see Table 3.3).
However, the process of reallocation of resources to larger, more productive firms 
meant that firms with a higher import content gained market share, concealing the 
process of import substitution in aggregate terms. The aforementioned results suggest 
that Spanish firms may be shifting the composition of their inputs towards national goods. 
However, this process of substitution is not reflected in the overall aggregates because the 
firms with a greater import dependency gained market share (see Table 3.2).21 These firms 
tend to be larger, more productive and, above all, more export-oriented than the rest, 
which confirms the key role of exports as generators of imports (Box 3.2 characterises in 
more detail the features of Spanish importing firms).
The behaviour of the investment income balance of the Spanish economy played a 
major role in the observed adjustment in the current account. Compared with the 
trade balance analysed in the preceding section, the Spanish economy’s investment 
income balance usually represents a lower percentage of the current account. However, 
this component played a major role in the adjustment seen in recent years, going from a 
deficit of 3.2% of GDP in 2008 to just 0.5% of GDP in 2015, against a background of sharp 
declines in interest rates (for more details, see Section 2). 
5  Investment income and 
its determinants 
18  See R. Bems and J. di Giovanni (2016), “Income-induced expenditure switching”, American Economic Review, 
106, pp. 3898-3931.
19  The number of firms in the sample which meet the time requirements is very small, so the conclusions must be 
regarded due caution. E. Prades and C. Villegas-Sánchez (2017), “Input trade and importers in Spain”, Working 
Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming.
20  The provision of liquidity considered is identified using information from the Banco de España’s Central Balance 
Sheet Data Office on banks lending money to sample firms. For more details, see L. Alfaro, M. García-Santana 
and E. Moral-Benito (2017), “Credit supply shocks, network effects, and the real economy”, Working Paper, 
Banco de España, forthcoming.
21  Note that this phenomenon is documented only until 2013 because no firm-level information on exports and 
imports after that year is available.
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Both the economic cycle and the normalisation of financial conditions over the crisis 
period contributed significantly to the adjustment in the investment income balance in 
recent years.22 Generally the income balance tends to improve in recessions of the Spanish 
economy (see panel 1 of Chart 3.8). Thus in the years before the crisis, the positive output gap 
and the abundant financing under favourable conditions in the international financial markets 
contributed to a deterioration in the income balance. These same determinants explain a 
significant part of the correction accumulated since the onset of the crisis. 
However, a significant part of the cumulative correction of the income balance is due to 
other potentially more structural factors, including most notably the increase in the weight 
of government debt holdings at the expense of private-sector liabilities held by non-
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of two terms: first, the simple average of the import content of all firms (average); and second, a covariance term which increases when firms with greater import 
content increase in size (covariance). For more details, see G. S. Olley and A. Pakes (1996), "The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment 
Industry", Econometrica, vol. 64, No. 646, pp. 1263-1298.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The table sets out the coefficients of ordinary least squares estimates of import content growth on an increase in the exogenous liquidity of firms [for more details, 
see L. Alfaro, M. García-Santana and E. Moral-Benito (2017), "Credit supply shocks, network effects, and the real economy"]. Included in the regression are the 
following control variables: size, export growth, sales, productivity, debt and sector-year dummy variables.
The number of firms analysed is 1,078,193. Standard error in brackets with firm-level cluster. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
22  The analysis of this section is based on the same methodology used in Section 3 of this chapter, which consists 
of regression of investment income in Spain (as a percentage of GDP) on its fundamental determinants, which 
include both factors traditionally used in the literature and variables of particular importance for the Spanish 
case. E. Moral-Benito and F. Viani (2017), “An anatomy of the Spanish current account adjustment: the role of 
permanent and transitory factors”, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 96 ANNUAL REPORT, 2016 3. CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT
residents. From 2014 other factors gained in importance and finally accounted for a considerable 
part (nearly 60%) of the total cumulative correction up to 2015 (see panel 2 of Chart 3.8). Notable 
among these factors were, firstly, the increase in the proportion of general government external 
debt, which tends to reduce the implicit return on fixed-income external liabilities (see panel 3 of 
Chart 3.8). Secondly, the gradual contraction of private credit was decisive in reducing Spain’s 
stock of external debt, which, in turn, gave rise to a substantial improvement in the income 
balance. Finally, other factors with a more limited impact were the depreciation of the euro 
against the dollar, which boosted income from Spain’s foreign-currency-denominated assets, 
and the decrease in short-term interest rates, which lessened fixed-income debt payments.
Despite the correction of the external imbalance in recent years, the negative net 
international investment position (IIP) is still high. Although the current account 
surpluses since 2012 have generated net lending equal to 8% of GDP, the correction of the 
high external indebtedness built up in the previous expansionary phase23 was somewhat 
6  International 
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SOURCE: E. Moral-Benito and F. Viani (2017), An anatomy of the Spanish current account adjustment: the role of permanent and transitory factors, WorkingPa-
per, Banco de España, forthcoming.
a The breakdown is based on a regression of the investment income balance on a number of cyclical and non-cyclical factors. Specifically, cyclical factors include the 
output gap (economic cycle) and financial market volatility proxied by the VIX index (VIX financial cycle). Non-cyclical factors include the net international investment 
position (NIIP), the nominal exchange rate, private credit growth (credit), population ageing (demography), government external debt as a percentage of external debt 
(general govt. external debt/total) and the short-term interest rate on debtors.
b The regression used is the same as in panel 1, but considering the cumulative changes in each factor rather than their levels.
23  The enlargement of the negative net IIP in this period mainly reflected a deterioration of the portfolio investment 
balances, particularly in private-sector debt securities, followed by other investment. The contribution from 
direct investment net liabilities was small.
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more modest, such that at end-2016 the negative net international investment position 
was still 85.7% of GDP, around 4.6 pp less than in 2012. 
The degree of vulnerability represented by a given level of negative net IIP depends 
on a number of factors. The implications of a given level of external liabilities depend on 
their composition by instrument, sector, maturity and currency. Thus, given a certain level 
of external liabilities, the refinancing risks will increase with increasing proportion of 
claimable instruments, which, like fixed income, entail future payments of capital, interest 
or both. Also, it should be taken into account that a more negative external balance cannot 
always be extrapolated mechanically as higher vulnerability, since its course over time 
depends not only on the behaviour of the current account but also on so-called “valuation 
effects”, as explained below.24 Finally, the degree of vulnerability may also depend on 
whether the external liabilities are high in net or gross terms.25 
The negative valuation effects derived from the normalisation of euro area financial 
conditions and the improvement in the outlook of the Spanish economy, prevented 
a sharp improvement in the net IIP. The negative valuation effects contributed significantly 
to the enlargement of the IIP in the past (around 36% of the total between 1999 and 2009) 
and also offset the improvement derived from the current account surpluses recorded 
from 2012 and a positive contribution of GDP growth during the current recovery (see 
panel 2 of Chart 3.9). These negative valuation effects, amounting to 10 pp of GDP 
throughout this latest period, do not, however, mean that external vulnerability deteriorated, 
because they are largely the result of normalisation of euro area financial conditions and 
the improved outlook of the Spanish economy, reflected in a revaluation of financial 
instruments issued by residents in Spain which exceeded that of foreign-issued 
instruments.26 
The composition of external liabilities may also attenuate the external vulnerability 
of the Spanish economy. In the case of Spain, the composition of external liabilities by 
instrument, sector, maturity and currency may mitigate to some extent the external 
vulnerability resulting from such a high level of external debt. First, it should be taken into 
account that the Banco de España has net external liabilities of nearly 15% of GDP, which 
in gross terms amount to 35% of GDP, and which are not subject to refinancing risk. 
Excluding these, the increase in external liabilities built up since 2012 (12 pp of GDP, to 
210% of GDP) was mainly in the form of debt liabilities.27 The increase in fixed-income 
external liabilities relates to government debt, while those of the private sector decreased, 
24  The change in the IIP between two points in time is determined not only by the nation’s net borrowing or 
lending, but also by valuation effects, which reflect the changes in value undergone by the financial instruments 
composing the stock of financial assets and liabilities, resulting from variations in their price due to fluctuations 
in the exchange rate of the currency in which they are denominated. Disregarding possible valuation effects, the 
IIP as a percentage of GDP can be approximated by the following expression: iipt – iipt-1 ≈ iipt-1 (it – gt) + cat , 
where i is the nominal interest rate, g is the nominal GDP growth rate and ca is the current account balance in 
terms of GDP.
25  Some authors argue that the relevant indicator is gross external liabilities [Shin (2012)], since it is a better 
indicator of the degree of financial integration with the rest of the world and refinancing needs are derived from 
them. However, L. A. V. Catão and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti (2014), “External liabilities and crises”, Journal of 
International Economics, 94, pp. 18-32, consider that net external liabilities are also a robust predictor of 
external tensions.
26  Thus, for example, once the tensions in the euro area sovereign market in mid-2012 had passed, the risk premia 
with respect to the euro area core countries decreased and, as a result, the price of Spanish government debt 
held by non-residents increased more sharply than that of foreign debt held by residents. Given that Spain has 
a net debtor position in instruments of this type, this price movement contributed to enlarging that debtor 
balance. Much the same occurred in the net position in shares and investment funds.
27  Non-debt liabilities, which do not necessarily carry payment obligations, consist of equity (as either direct 
investment or portfolio investment) and financial derivatives.
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in line with the process of deleveraging of the resident sectors (see panels 3 and 4 of 
Chart 3.9). The increase in non-resident holdings of government debt from 2012 relate to 
the recovery of confidence of institutional investors in the Spanish economy. Additionally, 
the structure of liabilities by original maturity and currency contributes to moderating 
refinancing risk because the bulk of them are long term and denominated in euro (around 
60% and 90% of the total, respectively).28 
In any event, the current level of external indebtedness represents a risk which must 
not be underestimated. The estimates of an early warning indicator of external tensions 
for a broad group of countries, including Spain, based mainly on the levels of liabilities to 
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28  External assets (159 % of GDP, or, if the Banco de España is excluded, 139% of GDP) are another channel 
which may reduce external vulnerability in adverse situations, since residents can obtain one-off funds by 
reducing the balance of their investments abroad.
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the rest of the world, corroborate this element of vulnerability, as they also do in the case 
of other euro area countries (see Box 3.3). 
Reducing the IIP to less vulnerable levels will require running current account 
surpluses over a long period of time. The behaviour of the IIP depends on the current 
and capital accounts, on nominal GDP growth and on interest rates. To illustrate the 
possible future course of Spanish IIP, we construct some paths of this variable based on 
assumptions about the aforementioned factors.29 The results of an exercise of these 
characteristics show that, assuming that the current account balance gradually converges 
to the cyclically-adjusted level estimated for 2015 (-0.2% of GDP), the negative net IIP 
would stand at 70% for around the next five years (see Chart 3.10), and would reach 60% 
of GDP around 2030. These paths are sensitive to a deterioration in the long-term 
macroeconomic outlook. For example, if potential real GDP growth decreases by 0.3 pp 
with respect to the baseline scenario and interest rates are 50 basis points (bp) higher 
along the entire path, the convergence on those levels would be delayed for roughly 
another five years. 
Achieving external surpluses on a sustained basis will require healthy public finances 
and sounder ongoing gains in the competitiveness of the economy. Reducing the 
degree of vulnerability derived from external indebtedness in a shorter time period would 
require an additional improvement in the current account balance. This would require both 
structurally sounder public finances and factor and product market reforms so that the 
gains in external competitiveness in recent years can be maintained and put on a firmer 
basis.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The scenarios in the chart depict IIP sensitivity to changes in the long-run current account balance. In the three cases the medium-term assumptions are the same 
for real GDP growth, the deflator and nominal interest rates (1.3%, 1.8% and 3.1%, respectively), but differ for the current account balance used in each of them. In 
no scenario are there valuation effects. Scenario I is compatible with a convergence to a long-run current account balance of 0.7% of GDP. Scenario II the implicit 
current account balance in the long run is –0.4% of GDP; and Scenario III considers a long-term current account balance equal to the estimated structural balance 
in 2015 (–0.2% of GDP). 
29  Long-term real GDP and GDP deflator rates of 1.3% and 1.8%, respectively, are assumed for this year. The 
long-term nominal interest rate used in the simulation is 3.1%. The variables converge gradually from their 
current levels towards their long-term levels.
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Since 2012 the non-energy trade balance has contributed 
positively to improving the trade balance, although this contribution 
has not been sufficient to offset the negative energy balance of 
Spain, which has thus continued to post a deficit (see Chart 1). In 
any event, the energy balance improved by 2.5 pp of GDP in this 
period to stand at -1.8% in 2016. The energy bill reflects the 
international market prices for goods of this type and the external 
energy dependence of the country. This second factor is 
determined by the relative importance of the various energy 
sources and the ability of firms and households to adopt 
technological improvements enabling them to use energy more 
efficiently. This ability will thus affect the improvement in the 
structural trade balance and the robustness of the economy to 
energy price movements.
Since it does not have significant sources of non-renewable 
primary energy, Spain has a high degree of energy dependence on 
the rest of the world and has to import most of its primary energy.1 
Chart 2 shows that currently around 75% of all primary energy 
used is imported, a figure which is very similar to that of 2000. 
However, this variable exhibits high cyclicity as a result of 
conjunctural changes in consumption and high supply rigidity. 
Thus, in the economic expansion before the last crisis, the degree 
of primary energy self-supply progressively declined and in 2007 
national production only met 21% of resident agents’ needs. 
Subsequently, the coverage of primary energy needs improved 
during the crisis to 29% in 2014 as a result of the lower economic 
activity, decreasing again in 2015 as activity recovered. Therefore, 
the coverage of primary needs largely reflects the observed 
behaviour in energy consumption (growth of 23% between 2007 
and 1999, of -19% between 2014 and 2007 and a 4.6% in 2015). 
However, also contributing to the improvement in the degree of 
energy dependence on the rest of the world, although to a limited 
extent, was the production of primary energy, which increased by 
around 8% between 1999 and 2015 due to the increase in the 
stock of renewable energy generators.
As a means of separating the effect of the economic cycle from 
that of technological improvements and increases in local energy 
sources, we consider below two alternative measures of energy 
dependence for Spain and the euro area: first, energy intensity 
defined as the domestic consumption of energy per unit of GDP 
and, second, the ratio of net energy imports per unit of GDP (see 
Chart 3). No significant differences in energy intensity are 
appreciated between Spain and the euro area. However, Spain 
makes more purchases abroad than EU countries on average, due 
to its lesser endowment of primary energy sources, although this 
scarcity has been partially remedied in recent years. Focusing the 
analysis on Spain, it is seen that since 2005 the degree of energy 
intensity has trended downward. Sectorally, this improvement has 
been most marked in industry, followed by transport. A similar 
trend is apparent in the ratio of energy imports per unit of GDP, 
although here the decrease has been less marked, indicating that 
a portion of the energy consumed ceased to be imported and was 
replaced by local energy. Thus, as noted above, the fall in the 
Spanish economy’s energy dependence may have a certain 
structural component.
To understand what factors may be behind this improvement, we 
analyse below the composition of the energy sources. Chart 4 
shows that oil is the main source of primary energy consumed in 
Spain (42% of the total), followed by natural gas (somewhat less 
than 20%) and renewable energies (14%). Both natural gas and 
the renewable energies currently have much higher shares than in 
1999 (11% and 1.9%, respectively), since they have gained relative 
weight at the expense of other sources, except for nuclear power, 
which has remained at similar levels (around 12%). The highest 
loss in share was that of oil, which dropped from 53% into 1999 to 
42% in 2015. This lower dependence on oil makes the Spanish 
economy less sensitive to oil price fluctuations on the international 
markets2 and, consequently, the trade balance is less exposed to 
oil prices. This chart also shows how all this has resulted in a gain 
in the degree of primary energy diversification3 over these years.
The biggest demand for oil products comes from transport, a 
sector in which, for the time being, the use of other energies, 
although growing, is very low (see Chart 5). The use of gas 
increased in all sectors up to the crisis, but the slowdown in activity 
reduced its use, particularly in industry. At present, the consumption 
of this energy source exceeds that of 1999 in all sectors, except for 
industry and agriculture and fishing, its headway being most 
notable in the residential and services sectors. The expansion of 
the gas network, which has doubled since 2000, allowed a larger 
number of households to access this energy source, although it still 
has ample growth potential;4 and, additionally, the environmental 
advantages of gas over other fuels have favoured its increasing use 
in other activities, such as heating and air conditioning in commerce. 
Renewable energies have enjoyed subsidies which have helped 
their expansion, particularly in electricity generation (see Chart 6). 
Although electricity is not a primary energy, it does represent a 
significant and increasing percentage of the final energy consumed, 
so it is particularly important to consider which primary energy 
sources it uses as raw material. Specifically, in the electricity sector, 
in recent years renewable energies (particularly wind) have ousted 
combined cycles which use imported gas as the primary energy to 
produce electricity.5
BOX 3.1SPAIN’S ENERGY DEPENDENCE
1  Primary energy is defined as those energy sources in which the energy 
is obtained directly from the natural resource (oil, gas and solid, nuclear 
and renewable fuels).
2  Given that Spain’s oil production is insignificant. For example, in 2015 
the level of self-supply of oil was 0.42%.
3  Measured as one minus the Herfindahl index, which is an index of the 
concentration of business activity which takes values between zero and 
one, higher values of the index denoting a higher concentration.
4  This is shown by the fact that in 2015, although 79% of the population 
lived in municipalities with natural gas supply, only 30% of houses were 
serviced [Annual Report, 2015, of the Asociación Española del Gas 
(Spanish Gas Association)].
5  Currently combined cycle and coal-fired power stations are used as 
backup plants, i.e. they come into operation when there is little 
renewable generation due to scarcity of water, wind and sun.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 101 ANNUAL REPORT, 2016 3. CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT
BOX 3.1 SPAIN’S ENERGY DEPENDENCE (cont’d)
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To characterise the profile of Spanish importing firms,1 this Box uses a 
database which combines firm-level information from various statistical 
sources and covers practically the total volume imported according to 
the National Accounts in the period 2000-2013. Specifically, information 
on the characteristics of non-financial corporations is taken from the 
Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office, which in turn 
draws on the financial statements submitted by those firms to the 
mercantile registers. The information on firms’ cross-border 
transactions and the volume imported is taken from the Banco de 
España’s international transaction reporting system.2
The weight of goods and services importers progressively 
decreased over the analysis period. Chart 1 illustrates how before 
the crisis the percentage of importing firms was substantially higher 
than the percentage of exporting firms. For example, in 2004 5.5% 
of Spanish firms were importers, while 3.5% were exporters.3 Note 
that, in the expansionary period before the crisis, the percentage of 
both exporters and importers decreased. This was due to the 
significant inflow of firms characterised by low productivity and 
non-internationalisation. However, in the years following the crisis 
there was an increase in the percentage of exporting firms and a 
decrease in the percentage of importers which left these two types 
of firm at a similar level slightly above 4% in 2013. However, an 
increase in the average value imported (see Chart 2) maintained the 
dynamism of aggregate imports until 2013.4
There is scant information on the characteristics of importers 
because the literature has traditionally focused on analysing and 
characterising exporters.5 However, the scant evidence available 
shows that importing firms have some characteristics similar to 
those of exporting firms when they are compared with non-
internationalised firms. For example, Bernard et al. (2007) 
showed that importing firms are larger and more productive than 
non-importing firms in the United States, and Fernández et al. 
(2012)6 report similar results for euro area firms as a whole. In 
Spain, importing firms are also larger and more productive than 
non-importers (see Table 1). Also, jobs with them are of a less 
temporary nature and they are more highly capitalised. 
Specifically, throughout the period 2000-2013, importing firms 
were four times larger than non-importers in terms of number of 
employees and 10 times larger in terms of net turnover. However, 
these differences increase significantly in the years following the 
global financial crisis, when importing firms are on average 
seven times larger than non-importers in terms of employees. 
And the trend is very similar in net turnover, where the sales of 
importing firms, which on average were seven times higher 
during the expansion, became 16 times higher on average in the 
crisis years.
The above evidence is in line with the hypothesis discussed in 
Section 4.2 of this chapter, on the effects of firm-level composition, 
which may have masked the process of import substitution at 
aggregate level insofar as importing firms have grown more in 
BOX 3.2CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPORTING FIRMS IN SPAIN 
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SOURCE: Banco de España, using SABI-CBI-BP information. 
a Including only those firms with at least one transaction of more than €50,000. The total firms in this sample comprise those on which there is employment 
information. 
1  The term refers to direct importing firms, since firms can also import 
indirectly by acquiring imported products through distributors.
2  For a description of this source, see Section 2.4.1 of the Balance of 
Payments and International Investment Position, 2013, published by the 
Banco de España.
3  Note that this is percentage is calculated with respect to the total firms 
in the sample used, which differs slightly from the total firms according 
to the DIRCE (Central Companies Directory).
4  As in the case of exporters, it should be noted that total imports are 
highly concentrated in a small number of firms. Thus in 2013, 1% of the 
big importers accounted for around 55% of total imports, while 10% 
accounted for 70% of imports.
5  See A. B. Bernard, J. B. Jensen, S. J. Redding and P. K. Schott (2007), 
“Firms in International Trade”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 
21, No. 3, pp. 105-130; C. Martín-Machuca and A. Rodríguez Caloca 
(2009), “Una aproximación a las características de las empresas 
exportadoras españolas”, Boletín Económico, May, Banco de España, 
and Chapter 2 of the Annual Report, 2015, of the Banco de España.
6  See C. Fernández, C. García, A. Rodríguez and P. Tello (2012), “Analysis 
of the import activity of European Firms”, Economic Bulletin, October, 
Banco de España.
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relative terms. This effect is also observed in apparent labour 
productivity, although the productivity of importers was around 
60% higher than that of non-importers during the expansion. This 
difference has increased to 100% in more recent years. Finally, the 
differences in temporary employment and capitalisation varied 
less over time, the temporary employment ratio of importers being 
40% lower and their capitalisation being around 80% higher.
To quantify the relative importance of these factors and so 
explain the probability of a Spanish firm being an importer, we 
estimate below a linear probability model which takes into 
account the sector of activity in which the firm operates. Table 2 
shows the results of the estimate, where each coefficient 
represents, within a given sector, how the probability of being an 
importer is affected by an isolated increase of 1 pp in each 
variable. For example, an increase of 1 pp in the number of 
employees raises the probability of being an importer by 5 pp. 
The results show that the characteristics which significantly 
increase the likelihood that a firm will become an importer are, in 
decreasing order of probability, being an exporter, size (proxied 
by number of employees) and apparent labour productivity. 
Specifically, being an exporter increases the probability of a firm 
also being an importer by approximately 25 pp. Also, an increase 
of 1 pp in the number of employees or an increase of 1 pp in 
productivity are associated with increases of 5 pp and 3 pp, 
respectively, in the probability of being an importer. This 
probability decreases with temporary employment ratio and 
increases with ratio of capital per employee, although the 
magnitude of these effects is significantly lower than, for 
example, the size effect. Distinguishing between the pre-crisis 
and post-crisis sub-periods, no significant changes are seen in 
the effects of size, productivity and exporter status.
BOX 3.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPORTING FIRMS IN SPAIN (cont’d)
Median
Firm size
(a)
Temporary nature
of employment
(b)
Ratio of physical 
capital
per employee
Net
turnover
(d)
Labour
productivity
(e)
2000-2013
Total firms
1.938.76.619.910.11gnitropmI    
6.325.59.83.336.2gnitropmi-noN    
Manufacturing
3.932.81.527.619.42gnitropmI    
1.528.55.110.525.4gnitropmi-noN    
Services
0.935.76.215.020.7gnitropmI    
8.226.58.90.038.2gnitropmi-noN    
2000-2007
Total firms
8.536.70.512.220.01gnitropmI    
4.226.54.75.830.3gnitropmi-noN    
2008-2013
Total firms
9.943.81.323.310.51gnitropmI    
9.425.56.017.622.2gnitropmi-noN    
Table 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF SPANISH IMPORTING FIRMS
SOURCE: Banco de España, based on Mercantil Register, Central Balance Sheet Data Office and balance of payments information.
a Firm size is based on the number of employees.
b Job temporariness is defined as non-permanent jobs expressed as a percentage of the total.
c Calculated as tangible fixed assets divided by number of employees.
d Net turnover, expressed as logarithm.
e Calculated as value added divided by number of employees.
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BOX 3.2
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPORTING FIRMS IN SPAIN (cont’d)
2000-2013 2000-2007 2008-2013 2000-2013 2000-2013
***830.0***680.0***140.0***150.0***340.0)a( eziS
                (0.000)                 (0.000)                 (0.000)                    (0.001)            (0.000)
***100.0-**100.0-***200.0-***500.0-***200.0-)b( sseniraropmet boJ
                (0.000)                 (0.000)                 (0.000)                    (0.000)            (0.000)
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                (0.000)                 (0.000)                 (0.000)                    (0.000)            (0.000)
***920.0***640.0***420.0***630.0***820.0)d( ytivitcudorP
                (0.000)                 (0.001)                 (0.000)                    (0.001)             (0.001)
***202.0***012.0***632.0***552.0***422.0)e( ymmud tropxE
                (0.002)                 (0.003)                 (0.003)                    (0.004)            (0.004)
***711.0-***913.0-***831.0-***381.0-***721.0-tnatsnoC
                (0.002)                 (0.003)                 (0.003)                    (0.005)            (0.003)
Number of observations   1,254,098      613,950      640,148         301,156 661,803
372,802311,58          239,752     986,442     456,673     smrif fo rebmuN
Yesselbairav ymmud rotceS
selbairav ymmud raeY
Firms  in the
manufacturing 
sector
All
Firms  in the
services 
sector
Table 2
DETERMINANTS OF THE PROBABILITY OF IMPORTING
SOURCES: CBA-CBB-BP and Banco de España.
NOTES: *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
This table sets out the coefficients of the estimates of a linear probability model, where the endogenous variable takes a value of 1 if the firm is an importer and 0 
if it is not. Coke and refined petroleum products are excluded from the manufacturing sector in the firm sample. Financial and insurance services are excluded 
from the services sector. Exogenous variables are expressed as logarithm, except for export status. All regressions include a constant and sector and time 
dummy variables. The coefficients represent the influence of each variable on the probability of importing, i.e. the marginal effects evaluated at the average.
a Firm size is based on the number of employees.
b Job temporariness is defined as non-permanent jobs expressed as a percentage of the total.
c Calculated as tangible fixed assets divided by number of employees.
d Productivity is calculated as value added divided by number of employees.
e Export status is determined on the basis of the firm's exports of goods and/or services.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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The level of external indebtedness of some euro area economies, 
including Spain, is a source of vulnerability, given that changes in 
the economic sentiment of the international financial markets 
could generate tensions in the refinancing of liabilities. In any 
event, external vulnerability depends not only on the level of an 
economy’s external debt, but also on a wide range of factors such 
as an economy’s cyclical position or financing conditions. Given 
their importance, the economic literature has attempted to 
construct so-called “early warning systems” to signal external 
tensions. These systems allow the identification of risk thresholds 
for external liabilities which, if exceeded, would indicate an 
appreciable increase in an economy’s vulnerability to international 
market turmoil.
This box describes the construction of an indicator which broadly 
follows the methodology used by Hernández de Cos et al. 2014.1 
The early warning system is constructed in three main stages. 
First, what is meant by an episode of external turmoil must be 
defined. The definition used comprises not only default on external 
debt or bailouts by international organisations, but also seeks to 
include other bouts of external turmoil associated with foreign 
exchange crises and a very sharp prior build-up of external 
imbalances, a mechanism which, for example, raised the external 
fragility of some euro area countries during the past expansionary 
phase.2 With this definition 76 episodes of external tension were 
generated for the period 1970-2011 in 15 advanced economies 
(see accompanying charts). Then variables were selected which 
significantly affected the probability of occurrence of these 
BOX 3.3EARLY WARNING INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL TENSIONS
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THRESHOLD PRESENT VALUE
1  See P. Hernández de Cos, G. Koester, E. Moral-Benito and C. Nickel 
(2014), “Signalling fiscal stress in the euro area: a country-specific early 
warning system”, Working Paper 1418, Banco de España.
2  Specifically, the literature [see L. A. V. Catão and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti 
(2014), «External liabilities and crises», Journal of International 
Economics, 94, pp. 18-32] considers that there is an episode of external 
turmoil when at least one of the following conditions is met: i) debt 
rescheduling or external debt default, or recourse to IMF or European 
Commission bailout programmes; ii) real effective exchange rate 
depreciation of more than 20% in a single year, against a background of 
falling real GDP (proxy of exchange-rate crisis), and iii) cumulative 
current-account deficit in the preceding three years exceeding at least 
25% of GDP, provided the negative net IIP in t – 3 exceeds 50% of GDP.
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episodes. Finally, an aggregate early warning indicator and so-
called risk thresholds for each variable were estimated.
The possible determining factors of episodes of external turmoil 
are chosen through a regression analysis in which the explained 
variable takes the value of one in each episode of external turmoil 
and zero in other cases. The results indicate that the total external 
liabilities to the rest of the world, both in gross terms and, 
particularly, in net terms, is an advance indicator of the probability 
that external tensions will occur (see Table 1). The composition of 
this indebtedness is significant, because the probability of turmoil 
increases when it is in the form of debt liabilities, while debtor 
positions in foreign direct investment (FDI) would not raise external 
vulnerability. Another key factor raising the probability of external 
turmoil is the size of the current account deficit, which generally 
gives rise to higher external indebtedness. Finally, the level of 
external liabilities being equal, more highly developed economies 
usually have fewer episodes of financial turmoil.3
In view of these results, the variables chosen to construct the early 
warning mechanism are the IIP, total external liabilities, net and 
gross external debt and the current account balance.4 Also 
constructed is an aggregate early warning indicator in which each 
BOX 3.3 EARLY WARNING INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL TENSIONS (cont’d)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.09*** -0.04*** -0.06***
       (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.02)
Total external liabilities          0.01**         0.01**
       (0.003)         (0.006)
**60.0-     ***70,.0-
)30.0(      )20.0(       
         0.01*
         (0.007)
**70.0       ***90,0
)40.0(      )30,0(       
Liabilities in foreign direct investment       -0.09**
       (0.04)
-0.64*** -0.9*** -0.71*** -0.85*** -0.94***
       (0.11)          (0.17)        (0.11)        (0.12)        (0.17)
-0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06**      -0.1*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.14*** -0.13***
       (0.02)        (0.02)          (0.03)         (0.02)        (0.04)        (0.02)        (0.04)        (0.05)
Budget balance 3.0        *73.0-        
)62.0(       )12.0(        
Deposit interest rates 0.03*** 0.03***
       (0.01)        (0.01)
Number of observations 1,547 1,508      762   1,498  1,548    1,507  1,102     619
08      3.89        3.131      2.89      241     7.37       841   031  2ihc dlaW
53.0        81.0        42.0          31.0        62.0         43.0         42.0       91.0      2R oduesP
GDP per capita relative 
to the United States
Table 1
PROBIT ESTIMATES.  PROBABILITY OF CRISIS (a)
(Variables expressed as a percentage of GDP, with a one-year lag. 
Coefficients show average marginal impact) 
Current account balance 
(two-year moving average)
Net external assets
Net external debt
Net assets in foreign direct investment
Gross external debt
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
a The table shows the coefficients of the estimates of a normal probability model (Probit) in which the dependent variable is a dichotomic indicator of external tensions. 
The sample covers 15 advanced economies during the period 1970-2011.  Standard error in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
Regressions include yearly dummies.
3  These results are robust to changes in the definition of an episode of 
turmoil.
4  These variables are available for the largest possible number of countries 
and have fewer quality problems than more disaggregated data.
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BOX 3.3 EARLY WARNING INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL TENSIONS (cont’d)
variable is weighted by its predictive power and which signals in 
advance the appearance of turmoil.5 The risk thresholds are 
specific to each country so as to maximise their predictive power 
[Hernández de Cos et al. (2014)].
Under this methodology, the aggregate early risk indicator for the 
euro area peripheral countries in the sample6 (weighted by the 
weight of each GDP) rose in the years immediately preceding the 
latest crisis as external imbalances built up in the euro area, and 
reached a peak coinciding with the turmoil in the euro area 
sovereign debt markets in 2010. Regarding the estimated 
thresholds, the current external indebtedness of these economies 
stands above these risk thresholds, although the gaps vary greatly 
in size, ranging from 20% to 40% of both net GDP and gross 
external debt. Thus, according to these estimates, the financially 
most vulnerable economies of the euro area, which include Spain 
because of its high external financial dependents, continue to 
exhibit significant vulnerability to a hypothetical deterioration in 
the international capital markets.
The foregoing results must be viewed with due caution, given the 
methodological difficulties in constructing these indicators. In 
particular, it should be taken into account that the thresholds are 
estimated using a small number of episodes of crisis, which 
reduces their robustness and their predictive power outside the 
sample used for estimating them. Also, this predictive power 
decreases as the signalling window becomes longer in time.
In any event, the convergence of the net IIP towards less 
vulnerable levels will require firmer and sustained external 
surpluses. These will be achieved more readily as progress is 
made in the adoption of structural reforms to improve the 
structural soundness of the public finances – made particularly 
urgent by population ageing – and boost the competitiveness of 
the Spanish economy by genuine gains in productivity, moderation 
of costs and reallocation of factors to the sectors and firms with 
highest growth potential.
5  The criterion for building an early warning system is to minimise the 
forecasting error by assigning a higher relative weight to false negatives, 
since turmoil is an infrequent event.
6  Greece, Portugal and Spain.
